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 Abstract 
We analyse the likely effects of changes in the monetary and financial regimes of EMU 
countries on the dynamics of output and inflation. In particular, we evaluate the impact of 
the regime shift on the forecasting performance of reduced-form models. Data for both the 
pre-EMU and the EMU regimes are generated by a relatively standard open-economy-
DSGE model with sticky prices and wages, and restricted access to financial markets for 
some individuals. We find that the effects of the shift in the monetary regime on the 
processes followed by macroeconomic variables depend on the nature of the shocks 
impacting the economy. For plausible shock distributions the reduction in the accuracy of 
VAR-based inflation forecasts is relatively large and significant. The effect of the regime shift 
on output forecasts seems rather more modest and statistically insignificant. The impact on 
ouput forecasting accuracy would be comparatively much larger if the new monetary union 
regime were accompanied by a moderate relaxation of constraints affecting financial 
market access.  
 
JEL codes: E17, E32, E37 
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dynamics. 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction
In the last few years, central banks and other policy institutions have shown an
increasing interest in Neo-Keynesian DSGE models (see e.g. Woodford’s 2003
textbook) as a promising framework to conduct forecasting and policy analysis.
This interest should come as no surprise. These models are micro-founded and, as
they assume sticky prices, allow nominal variables to play a relevant role. More-
over, equilibrium conditions can be approximated by a set of explicit economic
relations that resemble those of traditional macro-models -albeit with fully en-
dogenous expectational terms- in which parameters are deep in the sense of being
related to structural features of the economy. Last but not least, by exploiting
optimising conditions of a representative agent, this framework provides a useful
device to discuss optimal policy choices.
The new models seem, in practice, quite suitable for analysing euro zone
economies1. As countries participating in EMU have experienced a sharp change
in the rules governing interest rate decisions with respect to the previous regime,
the presumption is that forecasts and policy simulations based on non-structural
models will be heavily flawed as a consequence of their substantive exposure to
the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976). Only with a large number of observations in the
new monetary union regime would those models be able to recover the forecasting
ability they may have had in the previous regime. By contrast, DSGE models
need much less information to accommodate changes in the monetary regime by
modifying the structural parameters which have been affected by the regime shift.
However, the new-generation DSGE models are currently subject to intensive
scrutiny by the profession. So far, their forecasting ability does not seem generally
superior to more traditional macro models2. This explains why, despite their many
theoretical shortcomings, many institutions continue using standard reduced-form
1The Eurosystem has already shown a keen interest in exploring the capabilities of new DSGE
models.To our knowledge, at least the ECB and the National Central Banks of Germany, France,
Italy, Finland and Spain already have or are currently developing DSGE models.
2There have recently been some interesting attempts to build a bridge between VAR and
DSGE models using Bayesian techniques (see del Negro and Schorfeide, 2004 and 2005 and del
Negro et al., 2005). This approach has already delivered some promising forecasting results by
combining the in-sample fit of VARs with the more robust and parsimonious parametrisation of
DSGE models.
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models in their forecasting exercises. Along the same lines, some central banks
(see Bank of England, 2005) have already constructed hybrid models with a core
micro-founded part and a number of more ad-hoc components that help to improve
the forecasting performance.
Arguably, this suboptimal forecasting performance of DSGE models is partly
due to the lack of empirical relevance of some of their theoretical advantages. Most
researchers would agree that major changes in the so-called deep or structural
parameters in an economy might have significant effects on the dynamics of output
and inflation. But it is also true that these kinds of developments are unusual,
and that policy changes of a more limited scope are likely to have a meagre,
hardly noticeable, effect. Along these lines Taylor (1989, 1999), Estrella and
Fuhrer (1998) and Rudebusch, (2005), among others, have argued that plausible
variations in monetary policy rules do not change actual macroeconomic dynamics
in a statistically and/or economically significant manner3. These authors have
focused their analysis on the effects of changes in the estimated rules followed by
the Fed in the last third of the previous century on the stability of standard VAR
models.
The issue remains open, however as to whether the negative results on the
relevance of the Lucas critique found for the US apply also to a deeper regime
shift such as the creation of a monetary union in Europe. This implies a potentially
large transformation as a result of the elimination of exchange rate fluctuations
across member countries and the adoption of a brand-new common monetary
policy for all of them.
An additional element to be taken into account is that, in conjunction with
EMUmembership, most euro-zone economies have experienced other major struc-
tural transformations that are only partially linked to euro adoption. In partic-
ular, households’ balance sheets have changed markedly in several countries as a
consequence of the consolidation of an environment of macroeconomic stability,
lower financing costs, and increased flexibility and competition in the financial
sector. Those developments are also likely to influence the monetary transmission
mechanism and, therefore, the dynamics of macroeconomic variables in a relevant
3See Lindé (2001) as an example of the opposite view.
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manner4.
In this paper we provide an analysis of the likely effects of changes in the policy
regime caused by EMU on the dynamics of output and inflation as represented by
reduced-form models. We take as a reference for the analysis an economy whose
central bank conducted a policy of a partial exchange rate peg before joining a
Monetary Union (MU). As in other papers we generate artificial data for both
regimes using a relatively standard two-country DSGE model with sticky prices
and wages. However, unlike previous studies for the US -such as Rudebusch
(2005) or Lubik and Surico (2006)- we do not rely on the statistical significance
of the structural change of reduced-form parameters as the metric to evaluate
the relevance of the policy change. We rather assess the forecasting performance
in the MU regime of reduced-form models estimated with data belonging to the
previous regime.
In order to take into account the effects of a paralell process of financial lib-
eralisation we consider that -as our economy enters MU- the proportion of in-
dividuals with access to financial markets increases. This allows us to compare
also the effects on macroeconomic dynamics and the forecasting performance of
reduced-form models of the change in the monetary regime with that of financial
development.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the
theoretical model and derives impulse-response functions of output and inflation
under both the pre-MU and MU regimes. Section 3 presents our metric to assess
relative forecasting performance and applies it to VAR models estimated with
data generated by our artificial economy under both regimes. In order to provide
a comparison with previous literature on the topic, we also apply that metric to a
change in the parameters of the rule followed by monetary policy in the pre-EMU
regime. Section 4 analyses the case of financial liberalisation. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
We model a world with two countries. Households in both countries trade in
domestic and foreign one-period bonds. The central bank in each country exe-
4A case in point is Spain. In this country, the household debt/Gross  Dis p osable Income
ratio has increased more than twofold since the mid- nineties. Moreover, according to available
micro-information, the proportion of indebted households, which was around 30% in 1995, is now
approaching 50%. See Malo de Molina and Restoy (2005) for an analysis of the macroeconomic
implications of these developments in the Spanish economy.
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cutes monetary policy according to a standard interest rate rule that includes the
exchange rate as one of its arguments:
Rt = R
ρR
t−1
³πt
π
´(1-ρR)ρπ µyt
y
¶(1-ρR)ρy ³st
s
´−(1-ρR)ρs
υ(1-ρR)t (2.1)
where Rt is the gross nominal interest rate, πt is the inflation rate and st represents
the exchange rate. Variables without the t subscript represent the corresponding
steady-state values and υt is an unanticipated monetary shock. This partial peg
captures a key feature of many European countries in the run-up to the euro.
Except for their size, and a few other features to be mentioned below, the
domestic and foreign economies are symmetric. Thus, for simplicity, we describe
the domestic economy in detail and make explicit where it differs from the foreign
one.
2.1. Households
2.1.1. Consumption and saving
There are two types of households. A proportion Γ are ’rule of thumb’ consumers
(RoT hereafter) who decide on optimal consumption (cr,t) and labour (nr,t), with-
out access to the financial market (Galí, López-Salido and Vallés, 2004). Given
the amount of hours worked (to be defined later), these households consume all
their (labour) income and hence consumption is given by
cr,t =
Wt
Pt
nr,t (2.2)
where WtPt represents the real wage.
Unconstrained (intertemporal optimising) households have access to perfect
capital markets and maximise the following separable utility function defined in
terms of consumption (co,t) and leisure (1-no,t),
Ut(i)=Et
∞X
t=0
βtat
"
1
1-σ
µ
co,t(i)
cγo,t−1(i)
¶(1-σ)
-
(no,t(i))
(1+ϕ)
1+ϕ
#
(2.3)
subject to
BH,t(i)+
BF,t(i)
st
+Ptco,t(i) ≤ Rt−1BH,t−1(i)+
R∗t−1BF,t-1(i)
Ψ (bF,t−1) st
+Wtno,t(i)+
Z 1
0
ωt(j)dj
(2.4)
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where β is the discount factor, at is a preference shock, σ is the (inverse of the)
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption, and ϕ is the inverse of
the elasticity of labour when holding the marginal utility of consumption con-
stant. We also assume some degree of habit formation in consumption indexed
by γ (γ ∈ [0, 1]). Optimising households earn labour income as well as capital
income stemming from the ownership of domestic firms (
R 1
0
ω(j)dj) and from do-
mestic (BH) and foreign bond (BF ) holdings (the latter denominated in foreign
currency). There is no capital and the price of foreign bonds is augmented by a
premium (Ψ) that varies with the total amount of foreign bonds held by domestic
residents (Benigno, 2001). In particular, we assume that the premium depends on
the ratio of foreign asset holdings as a proportion of nominal value added, bF,t−1³
equal to BF,t−1st−1Pt−1Yt−1
´
, such that if bF,t−1>0, the return on asset holdings is re-
duced, whereas the cost of servicing the debt is higher if country H is a borrower
(bF,t−1<0)5. Under this assumption BF,t tends to its steady state value (which we
assume to be zero without loss of generality) rendering the model stationary in
the presence of transitory shocks6. As an additional simplification we assume zero
aggregate net supply of both countries’ bonds and also that domestic H bonds
can only be held by domestic residents, so that the following aggregate (financial)
market clearing conditions hold at any t:
B∗H,t = 0 (2.5)
BH,t = 0 (2.6)
BF,t+B∗F,t = 0 (2.7)
The aggregate first-order conditions of this optimisation problem are:
λt =
at
h
co,t
(co,t−1)
γ
i−σ
1
(co,t−1)
γ
−βγEtat+1
h
co,t+1
(co,t)γ
i−σ
co,t+1
(co,t)γ−1
(co,t)2γ
(2.8)
λt = βEt
Rtλt+1
πt+1
(2.9)
5This cost function is such that Ψ(0)=1.An example of this function would be: Ψ(bF,t−1) =
e−ΨbF,t−1
6Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) explore alternative ways to remove non-stationarity in
open-economy models with incomplete markets, stemming from the accumulation of foreign
assets, and find that all produce similar conditional and unconditional correlations.
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λt = βEt
R∗tλt+1
Ψ(bF,t)πt+1
µ
st
st+1
¶
(2.10)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint of opti-
mising households. Substituting (2.10) into (2.9) we obtain the uncovered interest
rate parity condition:
Et
R∗tλt+1
Ψ(bF,t)πt+1
µ
st
st+1
¶
= Et
Rtλt+1
πt+1
(2.11)
2.1.2. Wages and employment
The labour market does not clear. Workers set nominal wages and employment
is decided by firms. Each household supplies a different type of labour and thus
has some monopoly power in the labour market. A labour aggregator combines
labour services from all households and sells a bundle of such services to firms
according to a CES aggregation technology:
nt =
∙Z 1
0
nt(i)
εW−1
εW di
¸ εW
εW−1
(2.12)
where nt is aggregate per capita hours and εW is the elasticity of substitution
among labour varieties. Since firms do not discriminate between unconstrained
and RoT households, the following holds:
nr,t = no,t = nt
The aggregator minimises the cost of producing a given amount of aggregate
labour, taking Wt(i) as given. Household i’s labour demand is thus given by:
nt(i) =
µ
Wt(i)
Wt
¶−εW
nt (2.13)
From the zero profit condition of the labour aggregator we obtain the aggregate
nominal wage Wt=
³R 1
0
Wt(i)1−εW di
´ 1
1−εW .
Households are wage-setters in the labour market. Following Erceg, Henderson
and Levin (2000), each period only a fraction 1−θw of workers reset their nominal
wage to maximise utility. Let fWt (for simplicity we drop the index i) denote
the newly set wage at time t. Until the next reoptimisation, the nominal wage
7
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is adjusted automatically each period according to the indexation rule: Wt =
Wt−1d
ξW
t , where dt is the (gross) nominal wage indexation rate, which we assume
to be a function of aggregate variables observed at time t − 1. There is partial
indexation, measured by ξW .
Solving for the optimal wagefWt and aggregating across symmetric individuals
we have. fWt = εwεw − 1Et
P∞
k=0(βθw)
knt,t+kUc,t,t+kMRSt,t+k
Et
P∞
k=0(βθw)
knt,t+kUc,t,t+k
?k
i=1 d
ξW
t+i
PCt+k
where variables xt,t+k refer to the realisation at t+k of variables chosen by house-
holds that set wages at t. Given that we assume complete domestic markets, we
have it that λt,t+k = λt+k and using the firm’s optimal labour demand we can
relate the individual marginal rate of substitution to the average in the following
way
MRSt,t+k =MRSt+k
µ
nt,t+k
nt+k
¶ϕ
=MRSt+k
"ÃfWt
Wt
!
kY
i=1
dξ
W
t+i
#−ϕεw
(2.14)
MRSt+k =
at (nt+k)
ϕ
λt+k
(2.15)
Finally, given the aggregate wage index defined above, the law of motion of ag-
gregate wages is:
Wt =
∙
(1− θw)
³fWt´1−εw + θw ³Wt−1dξWt ´1−εw¸ 11−εw (2.16)
2.2. Firms
2.2.1. Final goods producing firms (final goods aggregators)
Production takes place at different stages. There is a continuum of firms produc-
ing different varieties of goods using capital and labour; these firms exploit their
(limited) monopoly power to set prices as a mark-up over marginal costs. At a
second stage, intermediate aggregators combine those varieties in order to gener-
ate bundles that are sold to the final aggregators of consumption and investment
goods. The final goods aggregators combine these bundles of goods into the dif-
ferent baskets of goods demanded by households. All aggregators are competitive
and obtain zero profits.
8
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We assume that all goods are traded. Consumption ct is a composite of goods
produced at home, cH,t, and imported from abroad, cF,t:
ct =
h
(ωH)
1
ρ (cH,t)
ρ−1
ρ + (ωF )
1
ρ (cF,t)
ρ−1
ρ
i ρ
ρ−1
(2.17)
where ρ is the elasticity of substitution. The relative value of parameters ωH
and ωF captures the bias towards domestic goods in consumption. The relative
demand for imported goods is given by:
cF,t
cH,t
=
ωF
ωH
µ
s−1t PF,t
PH,t
¶−ρ
(2.18)
where s−1t PF,t is the price of imported goods denominated in domestic currency
and PH,t is the price of domestic consumption goods. Thus, we are assuming
complete and immediate pass-through. The CPI consistent with the zero profit
condition of final goods aggregators may be expressed as:
Pt =
h
ωH (PH,t)
1−ρ + ωF
¡
s−1t PF,t
¢1−ρi 11−ρ
(2.19)
2.2.2. Intermediate aggregators and price-setting.
Intermediate aggregators combine the different varieties of goods produced by the
different sectors of production and aggregate them into a composite good. Thus,
cH,t(j) varieties are aggregated in a bundle cH,t, sold at PH,t; these varieties are
imperfect substitutes with elasticity of substitution φ:
cH,t =
Z 1
0
³
cH,t(j)
φ−1
φ dj
´ φ
φ−1
where
cH,t(j) = cH,t
µ
PH,t(j)
PH,t
¶−φ
(2.20)
and
PH,t =
Z 1
0
¡
PH,t(j)
1−φdj
¢ 1
1−φ (2.21)
As in Calvo (1983) firms set nominal prices on a staggered basis. Each firm
resets its price with probability 1-θ each period, irrespective of the time elapsed
9
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since the last adjustment. Each period a proportion 1-θ of producers reset their
prices, while θk is the probability that the price set at time t will still hold at time
t+k (thus, flexible prices require θ=0). Furthermore, the fraction θ of firms that
cannot reset their prices optimally adjust their price according to steady-state
inflation (πH): PH,t(j) = PH,t−1(j)πH .7
Firms are symmetric in equilibrium and the newly set price at each t ( ePH,t) is
given by:
ePH,t = µ φφ− 1
¶
Et
P∞
k=0(βθ)
kζt+kPH,t+kmct,t+kyt+k
Et
P∞
k=0(βθ)
kζt+k
Qk
i=1 (πH,t+i−1)
ξP yt+k
(2.22)
where Uc,t+k is the marginal utility of consumption at t+k and ζt+k=
³
Uc,t+k
Uc,t
´
. This
equation can be interpreted as a dynamic markup equation, so firms set prices
using the expected future changes in demand and marginal costs. We assume
mct,t+k(j) = mct+k:
mct+k =
1
(1− α)
µ
Wt+k
Pt+k
¶µ
nt+k
yt+k
¶
(2.23)
Only a fraction 1-ω of those firms that are actually allowed to optimally set
prices at t actually do so through this optimising process. The remaining fraction,
ω, chooses its price (PHB ,t) according to a simple backward-looking rule
PHB ,t = PH,t−1πH,t−1 (2.24)
where PH,t−1 is the average price at t-1. Finally, since the different varieties
of goods aggregate to a composite good through an Armington aggregator, the
corresponding aggregate price will be given by:
PH,t=
h
θ (PH,t−1πH)
1−φ+(1-θ)(1-ω) eP (1−φ)H,t +(1-θ)ωP (1−φ)HB ,t i 11−φ (2.25)
Once demand and prices of the different varieties of goods in each sector are
set, firms determine their factor demands by minimising costs taking the prices of
inputs as given and subject to the following technological constraint:
yt(j) = (ztnt(j))1−α (2.26)
7Smets and Wouters (2003) introduce inflation inertia through an alternative assumption
about indexation. Firms that cannot reset their prices optimally adjust prices according to a sim-
ple indexation rule, so as to catch up with lagged inflation: PH,t+i(j) = PH,t+i−1(j) (πH,t+i−1)
ξP
where ξP is a parameter that indicates the degree of non-optimisers’ price adjustment whose
extreme values reflect no indexation (ξP = 0) or full indexation (ξP = 1).
10
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Labour demand is given by,
mct(j)
∂yt(j)
∂nt(j)
=
Wt
PH,t(j)
(2.27)
2.3. Calibration
We obtain a numerical solution for the log-linear system. Although we do not
have a specific euro area economy in mind, we set in our benchmark calibration
relatively conventional parameter values for a medium-sized and fairly open econ-
omy. We would then conduct sensitivity analysis in order to check the robustness
of our results to different parameter values including those governing the size and
the degree of openness. Table 2.1 summarises the values of the calibrated baseline
parameters. The relative risk aversion coefficient (σ) is 2, the quarterly discount
factor (β) is 0.980.25 and the habits, γ, parameter is set to 0.75.8
The elasticity of output with respect to efficient labour (1-α) is 0.6, as in
Cooley and Prescott (1995). The standard deviations (σa, σz) of the shocks are
set to reproduce a 1% standard deviation of domestic output, whereas the first-
order autocorrelation coefficients ρa and ρz are 0.9. Foreign and domestic shocks
are symmetric unless stated otherwise9.
The probability of price adjustment in a given period (1-θ) is 0.25, in line
with some of the values of this parameter estimated for the euro area by Galí,
Gertler and López-Salido (2001), and we have assumed a similar frequency in
wage adjustment (1-θW=0.25). Finally, inflation inertia (ω) is set to a moderate
0.5.
The proportion of RoT consumers varies across countries in the baseline. We
assume that the smallest economy also displays a higher proportion of constrained
consumers (Γ = 0.6) than the larger one (Γ∗ = 0.3) before EMU. In section 4 we
will explore the case in which the proportion of RoT consumers in the small
country converges on that of the large country. This is meant to represent the
process of financial liberalisation that some countries may have experienced along
with economic integration in Europe.
8Andrés, Lopez-Salido and Vallés (2006) estimate even larger values of this parameter for the
euro area.
9To facilitate interpretation, impulse response functions are obtained with different shock
variances. These are chosen in order to obtain a response of GDP with respect to the steady
state of 1%. Given the simplicity of the model we do not aim to replicate the second moments
of GDP; however, our calibration yields volatilities of output close to those reported by Agresti
and Mojon (2001) for the euro area.
11
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We assume trade balance in the steady state. The share of imports of the do-
mestic economy is 0.4, while the larger economy is much less open (0.4
¡
C
C∗
¢
where¡
C
C∗
¢
=0.1 is the relative size). The elasticity of substitution between domestic and
imported consumption goods (ρ) is 1.5 (see Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan, 2002).
The weights in aggregators (ωH , ω∗H , ωF and ω
∗
F ) that define the home bias are
consistent in the steady state with the calibrated values of ρ, CC∗ ,
CH
C ,
C∗H
C ,
CF
C∗ and
C∗F
C∗ discussed above.
The last set of parameters refers to the interest rate rule. In the baseline
model, we set the autocorrelation coefficient of the interest rate (ρr) equal to
0.5 and the response to inflation deviations from target (ρπ) equal to 1.5. These
values are consistent with the original Taylor rule, although they imply a slightly
quicker and more aggressive response of the interest rate to inflation than that
usually estimated for EMU countries. The steady-state level of gross inflation (π)
is set at 1.020.25, i.e. the target level of the ECB. Finally, in the pre-MU years the
domestic interest rate is allowed to react to deviations of the exchange rate from
target (the foreign policy rate does not accommodate exchange rate variations).
This reaction does not imply fixed exchange rates in the benchmark case, but
a gradual upward (downward) adjustment in the nominal rate to prevent large
depreciations (appreciations): ρs=0.5.
2.4. The effects of a currency union on impulse-responses
We now take a first look at the change in macroeconomic dynamics that oc-
curs when both countries form a monetary union, comparing impulse-response
functions of output and inflation following different types of shocks under both
regimes. In all cases we take as a benchmark for comparison the model with a
Taylor-type policy rule that includes a partial exchange rate peg,and an inertial
component with calibrated parameters as in Table 1. The foreign central bank
has in all cases the same Taylor reaction function (except that there is no peg
to the exchange rate (ρ∗s = 0)). The shocks considered are: i) an idiosyncratic
demand shock, implemented as a shock to the domestic rate of time preference,
at; ii) a common demand shock affecting at and a∗t ; iii) an idiosyncratic technology
shock implemented as a shock to domestic total factor productivity zt; and iv) a
common technology shock that entails changes in zt and z∗t .
In the monetary union regime, the common interest rate is set according to a
Taylor rule based on area-wide variables weighted according to conventional para-
meters (ρy=0.5, ρπ=1.5, ρR=0.5). Graph 2.1 presents impulse-response functions
12
BANCO DE ESPAÑA      19 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0718
corresponding to the four shocks considered under the benchmark (pre-MU) and
the alternative (MU) regimes.
After a domestic demand shock, the absence of compensating exchange rate
appreciation makes inflation increase initially by more under MU than under a
partial peg. This higher inflation rate also induces a greater downward response
of the real rate (despite the reaction of the nominal rate) and leads to a stronger
output response. Thus the moderate reaction of CPI inflation under a partial peg
is the consequence of less demand pressure, lower GDP inflation, and the appre-
ciation of the currency. This pattern is reversed after some quarters; the stronger
response of domestic inflation under MU exacerbates the loss of competitiveness
and makes output decrease more sharply than under the pre-MU regime.
As for idiosyncratic technology shocks, inflation initially falls on impact in
both regimes, although the effect is less pronounced in the pre-MU regime as an
exchange rate depreciation mitigates disinflation. Price and wage stickiness and
the presence of a high proportion of RoT households also make output fall tem-
porarily in both regimes. As wages and prices gradually adjust to the productivity
shock, output resumes an expansionary path. Under the pre-MU regime, interest
rate hikes moderate output growth which therefore becomes less pronounced than
in the partial-peg regime. Since the expected increase of output is lower than
under MU, lower expected marginal costs generate, beyond the very short term,
lower inflation in the pre-MU regime.
Not surprisingly, common shocks -whether demand or technological- do gen-
erate similar output and inflation responses under a partial or a full-peg regime.
Since, under common shocks, the exchange rate moves little and home and for-
eign economies are fairly symmetric, monetary policy actions under both regimes
become virtually identical.
3. The empirical relevance of the monetary regime shift
As we have seen in the previous section, output and inflation dynamics are affected
when the economy enters a monetary union. The issue we explore now is whether
the structural change prompted by the regime shift significantly affects the validity
of reduced-form models estimated with pre-MU data to make inference on the MU
regime.
13
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3.1. The metric
Since the most common use of reduced-form models is to conduct macroeconomic
forecasts, we analyse the extent to which these models -estimated with data be-
longing to the pre-MU regime- fail to provide accurate forecasts when the economy
is under the MU regime. In our setting we will consider that the regime shift does
matter empirically only if reduced-form models that ignore that shift significantly
underperform similar reduced-form models estimated using data belonging to the
new regime. Our metric makes our analysis different from that followed in previ-
ous literature on the empirical relevance of the Lucas critique. Most papers have
usually relied on tests of stability of parameters in reduced VARmodels following a
change in the policy regime. While in statistical terms both approaches can hardly
offer substantially different results, our metric allows us to derive a more direct
and economically meaningful measurement of the performance of VAR models
after a monetary regime shift.
We will proceed as follows. We will first generate sets of data, each equivalent
to 25 years of quarterly data of output, inflation, interest rates and the exchange
rate, for both (pre-MU and MU) regimes using the two-country DSGE model as
outlined in section 2.10 We will then estimate VAR models for each set of data
and compare the out-of-sample relative forecasting accuracy in the new (monetary
union) regime of the VARs estimated with old (pre-MU) and new (MU) data.
In order to generate data we assume that the economy is subject to the four
types of shocks considered in Section 2: namely, an idiosyncratic demand shock, an
idiosyncratic supply shock, a common demand shock and a common supply shock.
All shocks are independently distributed and follow a univariate AR process. In
the initial calibration we have assumed that the variance of the demand shocks is
three times larger than that of the supply shocks. This is inspired by the relative
ability of both shocks to explain by themselves the variance of output. Moreover,
the idiosyncratic shocks are assumed to have the same variance as the common
shocks11. We will in any case explore the sensitivity of the results to changes in
those assumptions.
Relative forecasting accuracy will be measured by means of ratios of mean-
squared errors (RMSE) and by the Diebold-Mariano (1995) test of equal forecasts
10Actually, we generate 150 observations and discard the first 50 to minimise the dependen-
dence from the initial conditions.
11According to Giannone and Reichlin (2006), the relative contribution of common and
country-specific shocks to output variability varies markedly across euro-area countries . How-
ever, the average contribution of each type of shock is roughly 50% (see Table 4 in that paper).
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for a four-quarter horizon. All statistics will be computed using, for each para-
meterisation of the DSGE model, 5000 simulations of data and the corresponding
number of estimated VAR models.
Before we report the results for the regime shift caused by the creation of a
currency union, we will check, by way of illustration, what our new metric would
say about the empirical relevance of shifts in the parameters of the monetary
policy regimes as regards reduced-form models’ accuracy. This has so far been the
standard experiment conducted in previous papers that dealt with the practical
implications of shifts in monetary policy rules. It is, therefore, a natural starting
point.
3.2. Changes in monetary policy rules
We consider first our benchmark model under two monetary rules: a very tight
monetary policy rule (ρπ = 3, ρy = 0) and a loose rule (ρπ = 1.1, ρy = .5).
Table 3.1 presents the results of the exercise. Namely, the RMSE for both output
and inflation of the VAR model estimated under the old (tight monetary policy)
regime respect to that of the VAR model estimated with data generated by the
new (loose monetary policy) regime. To allow comparisons with previous work,
the first row reports results for a fairly closed economy (CHC = .95). The RMSE
statistic is fairly small in the case of output and higher in the case of inflation.
However, the Diebold-Mariano test does not permit rejection of the hypothesis
of equal forecasting errors. These results are consistent with those of Rudebusch
(2005) using tests of VAR parameter stability: while, as a consequence of the
Lucas critique, the performance of a VAR model estimated under the old regime
is expected to be inferior to VAR models estimated under the new regime, it is
hard to detect the difference using standard statistical tests. In the second row,
we report the same statistics for the case of an open economy (CHC = .6). As
in the case of a closed economy, there is no significant difference in output and
inflation forecasts, although RMSEs are larger in the open economy case. This
can be seen as an extension -based on a different metric- of Rudebusch’s results
on the empirical relevance of the Lucas critique to an open economy setting.
In the last four rows of the table we investigate the robustness of the results
found for the open economy for different shock structures. Simulations using
all shocks are informative but may also hide significant differences in forecasts
conditional upon specific shocks. To cope with that we also compute RMSE and
Diebold-Mariano statistics for economies subject to each specific shock at a time.
15
BANCO DE ESPAÑA      22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0718
Interestingly, for all four shocks, inflation forecasts are now significantly differ-
ent across VARs. Moreover, under an idiosyncratic supply shock, the hypothesis
that output forecasts are equal can also be rejected. This should not come as a
surprise as supply shocks are those which generate the trade-off between inflation
and output. Therefore, in a context in which only that type of shock matters,
attitudes by central banks towards inflation and output stabilisation would make
a clearer difference to output and inflation dynamics. This result suggests that
tests of the empirical relevance of the Lucas critique are dependent on the distrib-
ution of shocks in DSGE models and therefore on the least structural component
of the modelled economy, and one that is difficult to isolate from observed data.
3.3. Forecasts under a currency union
We will now proceed to check the impact of the currency union on the forecasting
ability of reduced-form models estimated with data corresponding to the previous
partial-peg regime. For the pre-MU regime, the VARs are composed of four vari-
ables, namely output, inflation, interest rate and the exchange rate, while in the
MU regime the exchange rate is dropped from the VARs. We will start with the
benchmark model as outlined in Section 2 using the variance ratios of structural
shocks presented above. We will then conduct some sensitivity exercises.
Table 3.2 presents RMSEs and Diebold-Mariano tests of equal forecasts for out-
put and inflation of VAR models estimated with data belonging to the pre-MU or
the MU regime. The first row reports results for the benchmark parametrisation.
The first striking result is that there is no statistically significant difference in the
four-quarter-ahead output forecasts of the pre-MU and the MU VARs. We find
however quite different results for inflation forecasts. The pre-MU VAR predicts
inflation in the monetary union regime much worse than the MU VAR. Mean
squared errors are 30% larger in the pre-MU VAR and the difference is highly sig-
nificant. This suggests that, as occurred in the case of changes in the parameters
of the domestic Taylor rule, variations in the interest rate response to domestic
developments do not easily influence output dynamics in a statistically significant
manner. However, it seems that the elimination of exchange rate variability does
make a difference as regards the CPI inflation process, regardless of the shock
structure in the model.
In order to check the robustness of the results, we assume -as we did before-
that the economy is subject to only one of the shocks considered. Results are
reported in lines 2 to 5 in Table 3.2. These experiments show a remarkable degree
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of similarity with the benchmark case in which all structural shocks are active. In
all four cases, RMSEs of output are relatively small and forecast differences are
insignificant. Moreover, in three cases we can reject the hypothesis that inflation
forecasts are equal. Only in the case of a common demand shock is the difference
not statistically significant, although the RMSE is still quite large (1.34).
In rows 6 to 10 we perform additional sensitivity analysis. In particular, we
allow for a smaller elasticity of intertemporal substitution (from σ = 2 to σ = 4),
in order to increase the sensitivity of consumption to the interest rates (row 6),
increase the share of domestic goods (from 60% to 80%) in the consumption
basket (row 7), and increase the relative size (from 10% to 50%) of the home
economy in relation to the MU total (row 8). We finally allow for full flexibility of
prices (row 9) and wages (row 10). As can be seen, within a reasonable range of
parameter values, the results for the benchmark exercise hold also for economies
which show more aversion to intertemporal substitution of consumption, or are
noticeably larger or more closed. Not surprisingly, though, when we allow for flexible
prices and/or wages, the statistically significant difference in inflation forecasts
disappears. Differences in the monetary regime are only important insofar as
monetary policy matters, as is the case in an economy with non-negligible nominal
rigidities.
4. The impact of financial development
The process of nominal convergence and integration into a monetary union has
entailed structural transformations which may have affected the functioning of
the economy in a significant manner. Therefore, by concentrating exclusively on
the effects of changes in the monetary regime, the analysis in the previous section
may fall short of identifying how EMU has actually changed output and inflation
dynamics.
By way of illustration, we assess in this section the impact of a relaxation of
the financial constraints faced by the economy. In particular, we assume that
when the home country joins the currency union it also converges to the degree
of financial development enjoyed by the foreign country. In our simple model -
without endogenous financial frictions- this can be approximated by lowering the
proportion of consumers who do not have access to financial markets. Thus, the
MU regime implies not only a common monetary policy but also an equal weight
of constrained consumers in both economies (30%).
As seen in Graph 4.1, the shape of responses to a demand shock is very similar
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to the case in which we ignore changes in the number of RoT consumers. However,
differences in output and, to a lesser extent, inflation responses are larger. As
there is now a higher proportion of agents that can borrow against future income,
output can respond more to the persistent expansionary demand shock. This also
translates into higher inflation vis-à-vis the benchmark case.
The effect of reducing the proportion of RoT consumers becomes more evident
when the economy faces an idiosyncratic technology shock. Output in the new
MU regime grows persistently more (or falls less) than in the regime of partial
peg with a higher number of RoT consumers. Supply shocks tend to reduce hours
worked on impact in models with nominal price rigidities (Gali, 1999). This is so
despite the fact that current consumption of Ricardian consumers increases along
with their permanent (future) income. On the contrary, RoT households must
reduce their consumption since their current labor income falls on impact. Thus
the impact output response is milder when the proportion of RoT consumers is
high enough, and it can even be negative as in our model. Likewise, the response
of total consumption, and hence of output, is stronger when the proportion of
consumers that trade in the financial market increases. The expansionary effect
on output of the reduction in the proportion of constrained individuals more than
offsets the expansionary impact of lower (nominal and real) interest rates in the
case of an independent monetary policy that partially accommodates movements
in the exchange rate. Besides, the MU regime avoids the appreciation of the
currency that takes place in the benchmark case after two periods and hence
induces a stronger increase in the real wage and in consumption of the restricted
consumers.
The relaxation of financial constraints makes little difference on the impact
on output and inflation of a common demand shock. In the case of a common
technology shock, output falls less in the new regime than in the benchmark case
as a higher number of unconstrained individuals permits the economy -through
a permanent income effect- to moderate the short-term contractionary impact of
the technology shock. Although the shock is common, easier access to credit in
the home economy prompts a significant country-specific expansionary effect.
We now turn to check how the relative forecasting ability of pre-MU models
is affected when the MU regime also involves a relaxation of financial constraints.
Table 4.1 presents the corresponding RMSEs and Diebold-Mariano tests. As can
be seen, in the new benchmark, the mean squared error of output in the pre-MU
VARs is 21% larger than that of the corresponding MU VARs and the hypothesis
of equal output forecasts can be rejected at conventional confidence levels. The
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RMSE for inflation is quite large (1.41) and highly significant. As expected, given
the impulse response functions above, the main difference with respect to the
results in the previous section in which only the monetary rule changed is that
now pre-MU VARs display a poorer output forecasting performance (rows 2 to
5). This worse performance, relative to the case in which the proportion of RoT
consumers remains constant, is largely due to the impact of supply shocks.
5. Concluding remarks
The results discussed in the previous sections help assess the actual relevance
of the Lucas critique for models of countries that have recently joined the euro
zone. Modellers are bound to experience considerable difficulties in representing
the dynamics followed by the main economic variables. Even considering similar
attitudes by National Central Banks towards price and output stabilisation in
the pre-EMU period, the focus on euro-wide aggregates of the single monetary
policy constitutes a substantial modification of the prevailing monetary regime
that may have non-trivial implications for output and price dynamics, particularly
if country-specific disturbances continue to be relevant.
Still, we have seen that, from a practical point of view, the shift in the monetary
regime may not jeopardise much, by itself, the ability of standard reduced-form
models to forecast output. This is broadly in line with previous research on the
relevance of changes in the Fed policy rules for the stability of VAR models in
the US. In the MU case, however, our results suggest that problems are likely to
be much more severe when conducting inflation projections, as the elimination
of exchange variability between EMU countries does modify the inflation process
in a statistically significant manner. Moreover, as EMU has been accompanied
by other structural transformations, the effects of the changes in the monetary
regime are likely to underestimate the relevant changes experienced in the dynam-
ics followed by macroeconomic variables in the recent past. Our exercise draws
on the fact that the reduction in interest rates together with greater competition
and integration in financial markets have increased the ability of individuals to
obtain credit, and this has helped them to make more efficient intertemporal ex-
penditure decisions. We have seen that these developments, alongside the shift
in the monetary regime, may significantly damage the accuracy of both inflation
and output forecasts based on available VAR models.
These results tend, in principle, to provide support for the effort, now under-
taken by many Eurosystem central banks, to develop DSGE models whose para-
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metrisation could be robust to changes in the monetary policy strategy. However,
our findings also stress the complexity of the task. Failure by standard micro-
founded models to properly address the relevant structural changes leads to an
inaccurate and, as we have seen, sometimes misleading representation of the re-
sponse of the economy to specific shocks.
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Table 2.1
CALIBRATION OF BASELINE MODEL
σ β α γ ϕ εW Γ Γ∗
2.0 0.980.25 0.40 0.75 5 6 0.6 0.3
ω θ θW ρr ρπ ρy ρs ρ
C
C∗
0.5 0.75 0.75 0.5 1.5 0.5 -0.5 1.5 0.1
CH
C
C∗H
C
CF
C∗
C∗F
C∗ Φ σa ρa σz ρz
0.6 0.4 0.4
¡
C
C∗
¢
1-0.4
¡
C
C∗
¢
0.0007 0.0168 0.9 0.0056 0.9
Table 3.1
FORECASTING ACCURACY UNDER CHANGING RULES1
OUTPUT INFLATION
RMSE D-M RMSE D-M
All shocks for closed economy 1.01 0.20 1.32 1.38¡
CH
C = 0.95
¢
All shocks for open economy 1.14 1.61 2.06 1.16
Idiosyncratic demand shock only 0.98 -0.21 2.00 4.06 *
Idiosyncratic supply shock only 1.36 4.17 * 8.60 5.79 *
Common demand shock only 1.16 1.29 2.20 4.18 *
Common supply shock only 1.10 1.70 2.80 4.48 *
1Compares forecasting accuracy of 4-variable VAR models estimated with simulated
data under first rule with VAR models estimated with data under second rule. RMSE
is the ratio of mean-squared errors for a 4-quarter horizon. D-M is Diebold-Mariano
Test of equal forecasts. Rules change from very tight
¡
ρπ = 3, ργ = 0
¢
to loose¡
ρπ = 1, ργ = 0, 5
¢
. (*) denotes significance at a 95% confidence level.
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Table 3.2
FORECASTING ACCURACY OF PRE-MU MODELS1
OUTPUT INFLATION
RMSE D-M RMSE D-M
Benchmark 0.97 0.32 1.35 2.91*
Idiosyncratic demand shock only 1.04 0.81 1.54 3.32*
Idiosyncratic supply shock only 1.15 1.28 2.30 4.24*
Common demand shock only 1.07 0.94 1.34 1.59
Common supply shock only 1.03 0.45 1.45 2.65*
Smaller e.i.s.(σ = 4) 1.01 0.49 1.23 3.05*
Closer economy 1.04 0.53 1.70 2.81*¡
CH
C = 0.8
¢
Larger size (50% of MU) 0.93 -0.57 2.80 4.06*
Flexible prices (θ = 0) 1.03 0.28 1.11 0.87
Flexible prices and wages 1.04 0.76 0.99 -0.20
(θ = θω= 0)
1Compares forecasting accuracy of 4-variable VAR models estimated with simulated
pre-MU data with VAR-models estimated with simulated MU data. RMSE is the
ratio of mean-squared errors for a 4-quarter horizon D-M is Diebold-Mariano Test of
equal forecasts. (*) denotes significance at 95% confidence level.
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Table 4.1
FORECASTING ACCURACY OF PRE-MU MODELS1
-Including relaxation of financing constraints-
OUTPUT INFLATION
RMSE D-M RMSE D-M
Benchmark 1.21 2.03 * 1.41 2.76 *
Idiosyncratic demand shock only 1.06 0.71 1.27 0.74
Idiosyncratic supply shock only 1.00 2.28 * 2.46 2.24 *
Common demand shock only 1.12 0.94 1.08 3.31 *
Common supply shock only 1.86 3.27 * 1.31 2.30 *
Smaller e.i.s.(σ = 4) 1.56 3.40 * 1.33 2.17 *
Closer economy 1.22 0.88 1.71 3.44 *¡
CH
C = 0.8
¢
Larger size (50% of MU) 1.53 2.82 * 3.00 4.63 *
Flexible prices (θ = 0) 1.04 0.69 1.11 1.06
Flexible prices and wages 1.09 1.16 0.99 -0.16
(θ = θω= 0)
1Proportion of constrained (RoT) consumers (Γ) goes from 0.6 in the pre-MU regime to
0.3 in the MU regime. Rest as in Table 3.2.
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Graph 1: Output and inflation responses under alternative monetary rules.
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